Security researchers found a way to turn an ordinary public ChatGPT share into code execution inside a viewer’s signed-in account. The exploit combined a graph that loaded the MathLive library with an HTML Preview running in a restricted frame. MathLive accepted messages from any origin and allowed them to replace its virtual-keyboard layout with HTML. That HTML caused the main ChatGPT page to create an unsandboxed frame, which inherited chatgpt.com’s identity. The researchers then used a YouTube JSONP response permitted by ChatGPT’s content security policy to run JavaScript in that frame. By placing the graph and Preview in the same shared conversation, they made the chain available through a single link; in one version, opening the link alone triggered it.
The injected code could use the victim’s authenticated session to call ChatGPT APIs, list conversations, retrieve messages from a private conversation unrelated to the share, and transmit selected data to an external server. The researchers say the same access could potentially support other actions available through the site’s authenticated APIs. The Preview’s own sandbox had not failed: the weakness was that a component in the main page trusted messages from the Preview, accepted attacker-supplied HTML, and created a frame without sandbox restrictions. The JSONP technique bypassed a further script restriction but was not the underlying flaw. OpenAI fixed the issue on October 26, 2026, and classified it as a P1 vulnerability.
Summary generated by AI from the linked article. hn.today is not affiliated with Hacker News or Y Combinator.