Seal is an iOS app that encrypts “sealed envelopes” - letters, photos, voice/video messages, files and secrets - so chosen recipients can access them only after the owner’s death or prolonged silence. The owner registers with a passkey/WebAuthn credential, meets trusted people in person to record their public keys and hand out pieces of a split estate key, and chooses per-envelope release rules (for example M-of-N after 90 days of silence plus warning periods). Envelopes use one random AES-256-GCM content key each, grouped into per-recipient key tables, and the estate key is protected either wrapped to owner devices or Shamir-split into shares wrapped to key-holders. All encrypted data lives in Apple iCloud under Seal’s container, keys never leave phones, and the app requires occasional owner check-ins to prevent premature release.
Security posture and tooling are explicit: there is no central server, no third-party telemetry, a standalone verifier (tools/verify_capsule.py) can validate signed event records and RFC3161 timestamp tokens, and core crypto files (X25519, ML-KEM-768, Shamir over GF(256), WebAuthn parsing, release logic) are highlighted for review. Important limitations are called out plainly: no independent audit, hardware-key registration untested with real devices, security keys sparsely tested, no reproducible builds, no cryptographic time-lock (releases rely on social process), and a placeholder timestamp authority. The project is single-developer, iOS-only, and invites code review before trust.
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