On November 16, 2026, attackers exploited Optimizely’s experimentation platform to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects, serving it from the vendor’s trusted CDN. The campaign, called Optimjack, reached visitors to 178 identified organizations, including banks, newsrooms, airlines, retailers, and technology firms. Its payload could replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses, steal payment-card data, capture cookies and screenshots, and deliver exploit kits to iPhone and iPad users. Fortirix’s external monitoring found 52 organizations loading the affected Optimizely script; five also appear on the publicly identified victim list. The 52 represent a dependency footprint, not confirmed infections. Because the detector has operated since June and covered only about 9% of scans, the count is a limited floor, not a complete census.
On November 18, Fortirix fetched 60 distinct Optimizely script URLs used by those organizations and found no remaining malicious payload or suspicious external references. This point-in-time check supports the conclusion that remediation was visible, but cannot establish whether unlisted organizations were affected or prove that every site is clear. The incident shows why allowlisting a trusted vendor domain and using subresource integrity may not protect sites when a dynamic, trusted script is compromised. Recommended defenses include inventorying third-party scripts, minimizing them on login and payment pages, monitoring changes in script behavior and outbound connections, and following vendor guidance to rotate potentially exposed credentials or tokens. Unlike a hidden server-side flaw such as Java4Shell, this attack was observable in the public scripts sites loaded.
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