Windows Hello permits short PINs because a TPM is supposed to slow repeated guesses by preserving lockout counters against rollback. On many x86 computers, firmware TPMs store this security state in SPI flash, while newer systems rely on Replay Protected Monotonic Counters (RPMCs) in the flash chip to prevent older state from being restored. The study examines whether this protection works in shipping computers, using inexpensive hardware interposers to monitor and manipulate communications between the processor and flash.
The researchers identify serious weaknesses that let attackers roll back TPM state, including PIN lockout counters. They find that voltage glitches can expose the HMAC key in Winbond flash chips, allowing forged counter values, while AMD’s NV controller fails to check that RPMC increments occurred and can be tricked into accepting suppressed updates. They also report that two AMD desktops without RPMC flash allowed lockout counters to be reset by reflashing an older image. In an end-to-end test on locked, encrypted hardware, the team recovered a four-digit Windows Hello PIN in 40 hours rather than the estimated 69 days. A recovered PIN can expose device-bound keys and enterprise single sign-on; the same rollback technique also weakens BitLocker’s TPM-plus-PIN protection, cutting the worst-case recovery time for a default six-digit PIN from 19 years to 20 days.
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