Commenters focus on eMudhra’s failure to meet Mozilla Root Program’s response deadline and the company’s claim that intense social media scrutiny and investor pressure impeded timely technical analysis. IcePenguin highlights Mozilla’s note that eMudhra missed an initial 24-hour response and a requested 24-hour extension. ForHackernews defends eMudhra’s explanation, saying legal review and furious stakeholders can delay a sober RCA, while antonvs and others call that excuse ridiculous and demand accountability. Several ask what leverage root programs have now that eMudhra has ceased issuing TLS certificates, and note Sectigo revoked cross‑signed certificates quickly, which some see as appropriate mitigation.
The discussion shifts to technical blame and systemic issues. Bradfa, tonymet and bob1029 point at poor HSM practices, weak generated private keys and possible imports or workaround use of wrap/unwrap features; nraynaud mocks the improbably tiny keys. Others, including tptacek and cpburns2009, argue the WebPKI model that lets any trusted CA issue for any domain is broken and propose limiting scope (or using DNSSEC), while opponents note DNSSEC deployment problems. Tamimio and several commenters demand stronger accountability for real‑world harms, and many emphasize tooling, process and vendor responsibilities rather than treating this as merely a publicity problem.
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