Eight intermediate certification authorities operated by eMudhra had their private keys compromised. Six issued TLS certificates, allowing someone holding the keys to create certificates that could appear valid for any website; the other two issued code-signing certificates that Apple’s frameworks do not trust. The six TLS authorities each have two certificate versions, producing 12 affected certificates: one chain leads through emSign ECC Root CA - G3, and the other through Sectigo’s AAA Certificate Services. eMudhra and Sectigo revoked the affected certificates. Apple began blocking all 12 on October 19, 2026, and also began blocking emSign ECC Root CA - G3 on October 23. These protections are delivered automatically, without requiring a software update, in Safari, Mail, and apps using Apple’s security and networking frameworks.
Most people need take no action. The concern is Mac command-line tools such as curl, git, Python, Ruby, Perl, and OpenSSL, which may rely on /etc/ssl/cert.pem and may not honor Apple’s blocks or check revocation. Administrators who need earlier protection can remove emSign ECC Root CA - G3 from that file; removing AAA Certificate Services as well blocks the cross-signed certificates. These edits affect every tool using the file and may prevent verification of some otherwise unaffected websites. A future macOS update will incorporate Apple’s changes and may replace the edited file, so administrators who make manual changes must check and reapply them until that update is installed. Tools with their own certificate stores require separate action from their developers.
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