An embedded-hardware teardown of the Eufy HomeBase 2 (firmware 3.4.2.2H) documents the process of extracting and unpacking flash contents from a Winbond 25Q256JWEQ chip. Initial on-board SPI reads with spring clips produced inconsistent, garbage dumps because other board components interfered, so the flash was desoldered and read off-board with a Raspberry Pi. Desoldering likely damaged a 64 KB block that remained unreadable, complicating extraction. Despite that, binwalk and 7z carving recovered U-Boot 1.1.3, a MIPS uImage Linux kernel, a JFFS2 filesystem and many XZ-compressed streams, though data-after-end and stream fragmentation required ad-hoc carving and manual searching to retrieve useful files.
Reverse engineering focused on how the OCEAN_XXXXXX management Wi‑Fi ESSID and password are generated. Strings and shell scripts show SSID and WPAPSK NVRAM entries and reveal the ESSID is constructed by concatenating "OCEAN_" with a derived SSID_MAC taken from ra0’s MAC address (awk picks bytes 4-6). The author used radare2 to trace related binaries and validate the generation logic and strength. Additional sections describe overcoming a UART lockdown by reflashing a backdoored U-Boot to gain a shell, performing filesystem workarounds to run the main binary, and technical notes on the limits and frustrations encountered during the hardware-focused research.
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